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Introduction

For the past five years we have been making our own subversive
intervention into the law school curriculum. Courses in "Gender and the
Law" are now common. Our course, "Gender and Constitutional History,"
is a variation that we have found invigorating to teach jointly: one of us is
trained as a lawyer, the other as a historian. Roughly half of our students
are law students; the others are humanities and social science graduate
students; a few are advanced undergraduates. We promise to teach the law
students to think like historians and the non-law students to begin to think
like lawyers. More importantly, we seek to restore historical context to
legal analysis.
When we began teaching this course, we did not appreciate how
extensively we would challenge the assumptions that the law students
brought to the classroom. The non-law students already knew they did not
think like lawyers and were looking forward to this taste of a new
discipline. But the law students had been well taught how to exclude
"extraneous" data from the analysis of principles, many of the law students
found restoring historical chronology and context challenging and
invigorating. We also gained our own fresh perspectives. When assigning
papers in which students reconstructed the history of litigation on equal
treatment in the state of Iowa, we found, to our delighted surprise, that our
students could make significant contributions to our understanding of
women's history, the history of the state, and indeed, the history of the
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nation. (Our understanding of Plessy v. Ferguson' shifts when we take
note of Emma Coger, who won her lawsuit against a steamboat company
that refused to let her in to the first class dining room. The history of
suffrage looks different when we know that in 1904 the women of Des
Moines won a lawsuit defending their right to vote on bond issues that
threatened to raise their taxes. Who knew that teachers in Cedar Rapids
had sued the school district to retain their positions after maternity leave?
Who knew that thirty years ago it was illegal in Iowa for a hairdresser with
a cosmetologist's license to cut the hair of a man, but it was legal for a
hairdresser with a barber's license to cut the hair of a woman?) Our
students taught us quite as much as we taught them.
II.

Background

The first "Women and the Law" courses were developed in the early
1970s.2 These early courses were offered mainly in response to the
demands of what was becoming a critical mass of women law students.3
Often the course was only nominally taught by a supportive law professor
willing to lend her name to the course, and was instead essentially taught
by students from materials that they had developed.4 By 1985, these
courses were so numerous that Ann Shalleck of American University
hosted a small but national conference of women law professors who
shared syllabi and materials for Women and the Law courses.5
Conversations at that early meeting focused on whether women and the law
courses were merely a temporary "fix" for the problem of omission, or
whether it was a worthy endeavor on its own account. At that early
meeting, participants concluded that studying issues about women across
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2. Linda K. Kerber, Writing Our Own Rare Books, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 429, 431
(2002).
3. In 1970, only 8.6% of law students were women; by 1980 the percentage of women
had increased to 34.2%. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education
and Entry into the Legal Profession: The Role of Race, Gender, and EducationalDebt, 70
N.Y.U. L. REv. 829, 849 (1995).
4. Yale students taught the course themselves in 1970 and then prevailed upon the
administration to hire Barbara Babcock to teach it the next year. Kerber, supra note 2, at
431. The first "Women and the Law" course at Wisconsin was taught by Jean Love in
1972, then by a visiting professor, from materials put together by women law students. One
year later, the University of Indiana inaugurated its first "Women and the Law" course,
taught by Jack Getman, from materials prepared by his then-student, Martha West, who is
now a law professor at the University of California, Davis.
5. Earlier national meetings to discuss women and the law issues occurred in 1971 at
Yale, sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation, and in 1972 at NYU, sponsored by the
American Association of Law Schools (AALS). See Kerber, supra note 2, at 429; Grace
Ganz Blumberg, Women and the Law: Taking Stock After 25 Years, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.
279, 281 (1996).
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the curriculum in a single course was an important consciousness-raising
endeavor; professors and students were gaining important insights as they
linked together issues that had been scattered.
These courses drew from the fields of family law, constitutional law,
employment law, and criminal law. Much of what they taught--e.g. the
inability of women to name their own children6-was either not covered in
the standard substantive courses or was scattered in the standard curriculum
and often taught from an outsider perspective, creating different
implications.
These first courses were taught in an exciting political context fueled
by grassroots feminist movements. In the early 1970s, the National
Conference on Women and the Law began hosting annual conferences that
focused on cutting-edge legal issues that affected women as a class. 7 After
Grace Blumberg published her path-breaking article on sexism in the Tax
Code in 1972,8 the National Conference on Women and the Law began
including sessions on federal tax law and on wills and trusts. 9 The U.S.
Supreme Court had just begun to recognize women as a protected class
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,10 the
Equal Rights Amendment had been introduced, and national activists were
mobilizing for its ratification."1 Finally, important doctrine was being
created as the early Title VII cases involving sex discrimination were just
beginning to be decided.
"Women and the Law" courses of the sort taught in the 1970s
continue today. Sometimes called "Gender and the Law" or "Sex and the
Law," these courses tend to focus on the "woman issue" in various
6. See generally Priscilla Ruth MacDougall, The Right of Women to Name Their
Children,3 LAW & INEQ. 91 (1985).

7. For a brief history of this important early feminist organization, see Patricia A.
Cain, The Future of Feminist Legal Theory, II WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 367, 378-83 (1997).
8. Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A ComparativeStudy of Income Taxation of
Working Wives andMothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1971).
9. See Women and the Law: A Sourcebook (Eighth National Conference, Madison,
Wisconsin) Mar. 24-27, 1977; Women and the Law: A Sourcebook (Ninth National
Conference, Atlanta, Georgia) Apr. 6-9, 1978.
10. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
11. The House passed the Equal Rights Amendment in 1971 and the Senate passed it on
March 22, 1972. The Congressional resolution provided for a seven-year time period for
ratification by the states. On Oct. 6, 1978, Congress added three years to the ratification
period. The requisite number of states was 38. The amendment was never fully ratified.
Regarding the constitutionality of the extension of the time period, see Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment: A Question of Time, 57 TEX. L. REV.
919 (1979). For a succinct and subtle history of the struggle, see DAVID E. KYvIG, EXPLICIT
AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 134 (1996),

chapter 17. For an extended account of the ratification campaigns in a single state, see
DONALD G. MATHEWS & JANE SHERRON DE HART, SEX, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF ERA:

A STATE AND THE NATION (1990).
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substantive legal disciplines. The disciplines covered may vary from
course to course, but typically there is a heavy dose of family law,
employment law, criminal law, and reproductive rights. This emphasis is
reflected in the two major casebooks in this field. 2
By the early 1980s, a new form of "Women and the Law" course
began to appear in law schools around the country. These courses, often
called "Feminist Jurisprudence" or "Feminist Legal Theory," focused more
on theory and less on substantive law. In 1983 the National Conference on
Women and the Law for the first time included a panel that explicitly
contained the phrase "feminist jurisprudence."' 3 Today there are a wide
range of casebooks from which one can choose when teaching a feminist
jurisprudence course,14 and Martha Chamallas has just published the
15
second edition of a "hornbook" on feminist legal theory.
An informal survey of the course descriptions of seventy-five
"Women and the Law" courses now taught throughout the U.S. reveals that
they are about evenly divided between those that focus on theory and those
that are similar to the thematic early courses. (Of course much depends on
how the professor approaches and interprets the material.) But only eight
of the course descriptions made any reference to the historical context in
which the law has developed. In the casebooks that most students
encounter, women's relationship to the law-whether constitutional,
familial, criminal, etc-is generally treated as a matter of discrimination
based on gender. The intellectual challenge lies in identifying the
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny in matters of equal protection. The
key historic cases-Bradwell,16 Muller,17 Goesaert,18 and Hoyt9-appear
as background as we move into the concept of suspect classification in
equal protection law. These cases do not come up at their own
chronological moment, though they stretch across a century from Bradwell
12. HERMA HILL KAY & MARTHA WEST, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION (5th ed. 2002)
(family law: 219 pages; employment law: 419 pages; criminal law: 135 pages; reproductive
rights: 101 pages); BARBARA BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (2nd ed.
1996) (family law: 203 pages; employment law: 508 pages; criminal law: 189 pages;
reproductive rights: 233 pages). Catharine A. MacKinnon's more recently published
casebook, SEX EQUALITY, also covers these areas but adds material on international issues
and interdisciplinary approaches for a more complete coverage of both law and theory.
Over 1600 pages in all.
13. See Cain, supra note 7; panels in earlier years included perspectives that could
fairly be called "feminist jurisprudence" but did not use the term.
14. In addition to those cited in note 12, see KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA
HARRIS, GENDER AND THE LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE COMMENTARY (2d ed. 1998); MARY
BECKER ET. AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY (2d ed. 2001).
15. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (2d ed. 2003).

16.
17.
18.
19.

Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
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in 1872, to Hoyt in 1961, and to Frontiero2° in 1973.
Our course-not surprisingly, since it is co-taught by a professor of
law and a professor of history-is steeped in historical context. We think
the inclusion of a heavy dose of history is subversive. It gives our students,
most of whom were born well after the second wave of feminism had
reached its peak and grassroots activism had receded from the levels of the
early 1970s, important insights into the continuing power of patriarchy in
the law. When we wonder why so many otherwise liberal students refuse
to define themselves as feminists, one answer may be that the instruction
that has been central to their understanding of American law and justice
erases the ways in which the antique practices of coverture and the belief
that different treatment on the basis of sex is not arbitrary but based on
distinctions that nature itself has established, has infected understandings of
equity from the era of the founding to the present.
We have had such a fine time teaching together that we'd like to
encourage others to consider similar approaches. Interdisciplinary feminist
pedagogy provides opportunities to address many important contemporary
themes: the limits of liberal feminism, the relationship between Queer
theory and liberal theory, the relationship between social movements for
gay rights and social movements for women's rights, and the gendered and
racialized dimensions of citizenship.
III. Our Course
Two major themes occur and recur in our syllabus:2 1 property relations
and the impact of social movements. First, we ground women's experience
in the old law of domestic relations, the law of Baron and Femme, Parent
and Child, Master and Servant, and Master and Slave, that the founding
22
The practices of
generation brought intact into the new republic.
coverture limited the control that women had over property and, by
extension, constrained their ability to act as free agents, shaping relations
between women and men from the beginning of the republic deep into the
twentieth century. Though the rules of coverture seem simple and
straightforward, the practices were complex and not always what the rule
would predict. 23 When racial difference was involved, applying the rules
20. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).

21. A copy of our current syllabus (material portions) is appended to this essay.

22. A good place to start is Christopher Tomlins, Subordination, Authority, Law:
Subjects in Labor History, 47 INT'L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 56 (1995).
23. See, e.g., Lanier v. Ross, 21 N.C. 39 (1834) in which a married woman with the
help of a friend and the consent of her insolvent husband bargained with a seller to purchase
property that would be placed in trust for her benefit. North Carolina recognized the general
legal rule that a married woman could not own property, but also recognized the equitable
exception that allowed her to own an equitable interest in trust. The North Carolina
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could become explosive.24 Much of our course, especially the first third, is
devoted to showing the cleverness and originality displayed by people who
lived in a system in which coverture controlled. As late as the 1960s, the
rules of coverture were still entangling estates and affecting married
women's right to contract.2 5
Second, we seek to restore social context to legal and philosophical
analysis. For example, constitutional law casebooks typically handle Reed
v. Reed2 6 and its successors by asking whether the Supreme Court's
decision was based simply on "rational review" or whether it was in fact
applying "heightened scrutiny." Reading these casebooks, however, one
wouldn't have a clue that shortly before Reed was argued, 50,000 women
had turned out for a parade in New York City-and more in other citieson the fiftieth anniversary of equal suffrage; or that while Reed was being
litigated, Senator Sam Ervin was mounting a strong campaign against the
ERA and, once it was passed, would offer the services of his office,
including his franking privilege, to Phyllis Shlafley and other ERA
opponents.27 In short, there is rarely anything in the discussions of specific
cases that sets them in the context of the stunningly expansive women's
movement, which, along with the civil rights movement, was the largest
social movement of the twentieth century, and which defined the ERA as
part of its agenda and lobbied with great intelligence for it.
The energy of women's liberation-and of civil rights and gay
liberation-cannot be understood without recognizing that deeply
embedded in American law and practice are unequal relationships that
assume heterosexuality as a norm and challenge the revolutionary
Supreme Court held that the equitable exception applied only when the married woman was
the passive donee or devisee of the equitable interest and could not apply when she was
bargaining for the interest on her own behalf.

Even after states adopted married women's property acts, the rules of coverture
continued. For example, a statute might grant a married woman the right to purchase
property as her own separate property so long as she used her own funds for the purchase.
But if she used her own earnings for the purchase, the transaction would not be covered by
the new acts because the common law considered her husband the owner of her earnings.
Thus, she would be acquiring the property not with her own funds but with the funds of her
husband. See, e.g., McElfresh v. Kirkendall, 36 Iowa 224 (1873); H. Apple & Co. v.
Ganong, 47 Miss. 189 (1872).

24. See Stephens v. Clements, 6 Binn. 206 (Pa. 1814) (recognizing the right of a black
woman to contract and thereby validating her agreement to be an indentured servant).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966) (questioning whether, under
Texas law, a loan agreement between the Small Business Administration and a husband and
wife could be enforced against the separate property of the wife; both the trial and appellate
court ruled in favor of the wife on the basis of the Texas law of coverture; the Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that there was no sufficient federal interest to trump state property
law).
26. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
27. See MATHEWS & DE HART, supra note 11.
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principles of equality, liberty, and justice. Reed, Frontiero, and all the rest
30
29
of the decisions down to Romer,28 Bowers, Morrison, and the 2003
32 and Lawrence,3 3 cannot be fully
3 1 Bollinger,
decisions in Hibbs,
understood until we make room for the social movements that energized
the litigators and gave them the language, the energy, and the sense of
that enabled them to challenge the established ways of doing
entitlement
34
things.
Our students learn to appreciate this context partly by our lectures and
the reading we assign, which includes the work of historians as well as
legal scholars. Even more important, however, is their own research. We
start them off by offering a list of selected Iowa appellate cases that involve
issues of gender. We choose Iowa cases so that the students have a good
chance of finding briefs and court papers, coverage in local newspapers,
and for more recent cases, the ability to interview some of the litigants. We
use appellate cases because the files are more likely to have been archived.
The cases we list are ones that we think the students will find interesting,
but once they have done the research, we are almost always happily
surprised by how much they have found and how significant these
of our favorite cases are: (1) Coger
underexamined cases often are. Three
36
35 (2) Coggeshall v. City of Des Moines,
Co.,
Packet
Union
West
v. North
37
and (3) Green v. Shama.
A.

38
Coger v. North West Union Packet Co.

Emma Coger was a young schoolteacher in Illinois, African-American
and light-skinned. It does not appear that she lived her life championing
the cause of her race. But in the 1870s she staged what is unquestionably
one of the earliest "sit-ins" (or perhaps, more accurately, a "sit-down") to
assert her right to equal treatment. She boarded the steamer, S.S. Merrill,
28. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). For the complete story about this case and
the movements that were engaged in it, see LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG,
STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL (1998).
29. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For more about this case, see PATRICIA
A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND GAY
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 169-82 (2000).

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
For discussions about the role of social movements in litigation, see generally CAIN,

supra note 29 and JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND
OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994).

35.
36.
37.
38.

37 Iowa 145 (1873).
117 N.W. 309 (Iowa 1908).
217 N.W.2d 547 (Iowa 1974).
37 Iowa 145 (1873).
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in Burlington, Iowa, intending to travel down the Mississippi to Quincy,
Illinois. She had difficulty purchasing a first-class meal ticket as the
company's policy was not to afford such service to colored people. When
she asked a chambermaid on the steamer to purchase such a ticket for her,
the ticket came back with "colored girl" written on it. She returned that
ticket and asked a white gentleman to purchase a ticket for her. Using the
new ticket, she went into the dining cabin and seated herself at the "ladies
table." Shortly thereafter, the captain arrived and asked her to remove
herself. At this point a scuffle ensued. As the Iowa Supreme Court
described it:
The request was for her to leave the table and take her meal on
the guards or in the pantry, not to leave the reserved seat and take
another. She refused, and thereupon the captain of the boat was
sent for, who repeated the request, and, being denied compliance,
he proceeded by force to remove her from the table and the cabin
of the boat. She resisted so that considerable violence was
necessary to drag her out of the cabin, and, in the struggle, the
covering of the table was torn off and dishes broken, and the
officer received a slight injury. The defendant's witnesses testify
that she used abusive, threatening and coarse language during
and after the struggle, but this she denies. Certain it is, however,
that by her spirited resistance and her defiant words, as well as by
her pertinacity in demanding the recognition of her rights and in
vindicating them, she has exhibited evidence of the Anglo-Saxon
blood that flows in her veins. While we may consider that the
evidence, as to her words and conduct, does not tend to establish
that female delicacy and timidity so much praised, yet it does
show an energy and firmness in defense of her rights not
altogether unworthy of admiration.
But neither womanly
delicacy nor unwomanly courage has any thing to do with her
legal rights and the remedies for their deprivation. These are to
be settled without regard to such personal traits of character. 39
Recognizing Emma Coger's right to equal access to public
accommodations, the Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the jury verdict of
$250 in her favor, as compensation for the assault and battery she suffered.
B.

40
Coggeshall v. City of Des Moines

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, despairing from the failure
to achieve full voting rights, Iowa suffragists joined their colleagues across
the nation in attempting to find a partial solution. Narrowing their claims
to the traditional American principle of "no taxation without
39. Coger, 37 Iowa at *1.
40. 117 N.W. 309 (Iowa 1908).
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representation," in 1894 they persuaded the legislature to permit women to
vote in "any city, town or school election, on the question of issuing any
bonds for municipal or school purposes, and for the purpose of borrowing
"41 And in 1898,
money, or on the question of increasing the tax levy ....
Des Moines women, placing their ballots in a separate box at polling
places, voted on the question of purchasing a new water works for the city.
In 1907, another special election was called; one question was "Shall
the city of Des Moines erect a city hall at a cost, not exceeding
$350,000? ''42

By not specifying levying taxes or issuing bonds, the

proponents believed they could exclude women from the polls, and city
officials made no effort to prepare for their votes. When activist women
attempted to vote they were turned away. Within a month, a group of
plaintiffs, led by Mary J. Coggeshall and attorney Grace Ballantyne,
challenged their exclusion from the polls. When they lost in District Court
they appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court: "[w]hen the law of the land
admits certain persons to even an insignificant place among the ranks of
[electors], then ...

the free exercise of that granted right must be as fully

protected by the courts as the political rights of those who first appropriated
the power to make and limit the grant. ' 43
The women found a sympathetic listener in Chief Justice Scott M.
Ladd, who observed, "The right of suffrage is a political right of the highest
dignity. '44 While the Constitution of the State of Iowa granted the right to
'45
vote to "[e]very male citizen of the United States of the age of 21 years, ,
who had lived in the state for the previous six months and in the county for
sixty days, Ladd denied that the state constitution inhibited the expansion
of suffrage to women-which, indeed, the legislature had done. He
concluded that the "plaintiffs were entitled to vote on the question
submitted at a special election June 20, 1907, and were illegally deprived
of that privilege. ' 4, 6 He acknowledged that when an individual was
disqualified from voting because of an error in judgment by a voting
official, "there is no remedy" and the election remains valid. But in 1907,
the voting officials had excluded "an entire class of voters . . .numerous

enough to have changed the result. The denial is then in the nature of
oppression and operates to defeat the very purpose of the election ....
41. 1894 lowaActs ch. 39.
42. Id. at 309.
43. Abstract and Arguments in the Supreme Court of Iowa, May Term, 1908.
Appellants Brief and Argument, 560-61. We are indebted to Eleanor H. McConnell,
Fighting City Hall: The Battle for Municipal Suffrage in Progressive Era Des Moines,
(2001) (unpublished paper on file with authors).
44. Coggeshall, 117 N.W. at312.
45. Id. at 311.
46. Id. at 313.
47. Id.at 314.
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Ladd concluded impatiently: "According to the last state census, there
were 19,179 native-born women above 21 years of age residing in Des
Moines, or 741 more than there were men of like age." He refused to split
hairs over the question of whether the outcome of the election would have
shifted had women been able to vote; it was obvious that there were "more
qualified female voters than were necessary to overcome the majority. 48
Coggeshall, Ballantyne, and their colleagues--determined citizens fighting
corruption, despite their marginality-had persuaded the Iowa Supreme
Court to declare the election invalid.
C.

49
Green v. Shama

By the early 1970s, long shaggy hair had spread from young men to
the middle-aged, from drop-outs to the middle class. Scorning traditional
barbers and the close-cut hair styles barbers had been trained to cut,
increasing numbers of men gravitated to cosmetologists, hairdressers
accustomed to styling women's long hair. The Sioux City Journal even ran
an advertisement placed by a beauty salon that was aimed at men: "Shag
it!"
But when men turned up in women's beauty parlors, the parlors were
breaking the law. Iowa statutes had long provided that barbers (virtually all
men) could cut the hair of men or women, but cosmetologists (mostly
women, but also a few men) could legally cut only the hair of women and
of boys under the age of eleven. So when Rose Shama and Gary
McCormack advertised that their salon understood the challenges of longer
hair and welcomed men, Charles Green and other licensed barbers saw
their livelihood at stake. The barbers argued that Shama and McCormack
were maintaining "an unlicensed barber shop" and were engaging in false
advertising since cosmetologists could not solicit adult men for haircuts.
Both sides agreed that every citizen had the right to pursue any legitimate
trade or occupation; and both sides agreed that the state could exercise its
police power to pass laws to benefit the health and general welfare. But
were the Iowa statutes reasonably related to the public health and safety?
Or were the statutes "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable," because they
were intended to "limit competition under the guise of protecting the health
and safety of the male public?"
In fact, the Iowa legislature was at that moment debating the same
point. But the legislature was slowed down by the resistance of the
organized barbers, and the Iowa Supreme Court would need to make a
decision well before the legislature settled the matter.
In a series of arguments that are hard to credit now-it was, after all,
48. Id.
49. 217 N.W.2d 547 (Iowa 1974).
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1974, only thirty years ago-the barbers asserted that the challenges they
faced called for more skill and sophistication than cosmetologists were
trained for. As the Court summarized it:
From the record we learn that differing approaches have been
taken to men's and women's hair styling because of
physiological differences between the sexes. Females have finer
features due to the bony structure of the face and to the presence
of a layer of fatty tissue which covers their bodies but not a
male's. The female hairline differs due to the absence of
sideburns and facial hair .... Men suffer from baldness far more
than women. 50
Adult male features change more than a female's because of
facial hair, sideburns and exposure to the elements at work.
Changes in a female's hair occur during menstrual and pregnancy
periods. Health hazards are generally of greater incidence in
cutting men's hair because they often come to a barber from
performing manual labor and thus there are higher probabilities
of spreading contagious diseases; the same hazards are not
generally present in regard to women.5 1
The barbers had trouble discriminating between cultural style and
biological situation:
Because of these differences, hair styling between the sexes
differs. As a general rule, male hair has been cut short and, even
if cut long, has a square, box-like appearance designed to look
masculine.5 2
Despite two dissenting votes--"Plaintiffs' assertions are untenable"
observed Justice McCormick-the barbers won. The arguments were
framed in terms of Equal Protection and the right to practice a calling, but,
as the dissenting Justice concluded, what was actually at work was
competition for clients; it was the statutes that were unconstitutional, not
the practices. "This case would not have arisen had not a substantial
number of men come to prefer what cosmetologists do with hair to what
barbers do with hair." And for another year or so, in towns and cities
across the state of Iowa, otherwise respectable, law-abiding men turned up
quietly, after hours, without formal appointments, in unisex salons that
dared not speak their names.5 3

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 549-50.
Id. at 550.
Id.
We are indebted to the research of Emily Coleman and Eriko Ugihara.
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IV. What We've Learned
We have taught each other at least as much as we've taught our
students; teaching together has been a selfishly enriching experience for
both of us. Our students see that we are learning from each other, and that
makes it easier for them to learn from each other and to learn from us. We
hope the law students will emerge from class with a greater appreciation of
the role of chance and serendipity in defining the challenges that lawyers
face. We hope they emerge with an understanding that all knowledge is
not included in Westlaw. (We figured out a long time ago that the grade on
the research paper has only a little bit to do with brain power and mostly to
do with how early in the semester they leave their computers and go into
the library and mess around with old newspapers and manuscripts.) We
hope the non-law students will learn to respect the contours of legal
argument and the skills involved in cutting away the brambles of
serendipity to reveal the underlying issues. We ask all our students to
suspend their disbelief and try to imagine themselves in a time when
coverture was the common sense of the matter, when slavery was a given,
and when reasonable people had to wrestle with assumptions about the
normative state of affairs that is very foreign to us now. We hope that we
can ground 1973 in its own historical context for this generation of students
who think it ancient history; 1773 (the Boston Tea Party), 1872 (Bradwell),
1973 (Frontiero), 2003 (Lawrence) all come in necessary chronological
order.
In conclusion, Pat would say that she now finds it difficult to think of
anything outside of chronological order, and this approach has infused her
other courses. When she teaches her usual courses in trusts and estates and
in tax, she includes much more about coverture and women's property.
Linda would proudly say that she has learned to prompt students to "brief'
a case technically-run a soft "paper chase" classroom, as it were. In her
history department courses, Linda now grades exams anonymously
(students get random numbers). And she has come to take pride in the fact
that knowing some history can make a valuable contribution to lawyers'
understanding of the issues that they face. We are not the only pair of
lawyer/historian teaching together; last year Carol Sanger and Alice
Kessler-Harris developed a course that focuses on family law in historical
54
context at Columbia.
Our project retrieves many hidden aspects of women's complex
history. Its goals, like those of any feminist project, are to uncover the
hidden sites of power and to discern where power can be challenged. It is
empowering to know that in 1908, well before women could vote in
54. The course was taught in the Spring semester of 2003 at Columbia and was called:
Meanings of Motherhood: Historical and Legal Perspectives.
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general elections, the women of Des Moines took on the power structure of
the largest city in their state and won. It is empowering to know that long
before Plessy, Emma Coger, a lone African-American woman, challenged
a steamship company and won. Of course, most of the time the plaintiffs in
our cases lose, but in questioning why they lost our students get angry,
emerging not only with a lot of new information, but also with the
commitment to direct their future work and research so as to disrupt
inherited knowledge. We hope others will develop more versions of this
subversive strategy.
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Appendix
University of Iowa
School of Law
Fall, 2003
Gender and the Law: Constitutional History
Professor Patricia A. Cain
patricia-cain(iuiowa.edu
Professor Linda K. Kerber
linda-kerber(auiowa.edu
PURPOSE OF COURSE:
This course is an effort to merge the approaches of historians and
lawyers as we examine major themes in the history of gender and the law,
especially constitutional law. The Federal Constitution of 1787 made no
distinctions of gender and rarely used the generic he. The term "male" was
-not introduced into the Constitution until after the Civil War, and then only
in the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (a clause that has
never been acted upon). Yet the relationship of men and women to the
protections of the Constitution has differed; the ability of men and women
to make claims of the state has varied; and the meaning of equal protection
of the laws, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, has been
experienced differently for men and for women.
The field of legal history has grown rapidly in recent years, greatly
enriched by the work of scholars who address legal questions in deep
historical context. We are hoping that those who enter the class having
been trained as historians will emerge with some sense of what it means to
think like a lawyer; that is, with an emphasis on principles of justice, rules
of procedure, and the craft of argument. We hope that those who enter the
class as law students will emerge with a greater appreciation for the role of
social and historical context, and also the role of serendipity in shaping the
legal challenges that courts and lawyers face.
Our course will be conducted in a lecture/discussion format. Plan to
read in advance of each day's assignment so that our class can be an
interactive one. Required readings are drawn from many different genres:
legal documents like court decisions, briefs and legislation; analytical
chapters and essays by historians and lawyers. These different genres
suggest different analytical strategies.
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Research paper. Each student will submit a 10 page paper by Friday,
December 5. The paper will place a single case in social and historical
context. It will count 50% of your final grade.
The written paper will be the separate effort of individual students.
But students will work collaboratively on the research. Groups will present
their work to the class in November (see syllabus). We have prepared a list
of Iowa cases that deal with significant matters of gender and the law. You
will have the opportunity to rank your top choices and we will try, but
cannot promise, to assign you to a group based on one of your selections.
Be prepared to turn in a case selection card by September 17.
We have scheduled visits to the Law Library and to the Main Library
that will introduce you to research strategies and library resources for this
project.
Paper presentations. Students will present their contextualized case in
teams toward the end of the semester.
Final exam. The final examination will include questions that ask you
to display both historical and legal analysis. It will be a three-hour openbook exam on Tuesday, December 16 at 8:30 AM in the law building.
Laptop computers, cell phones, or personal digital assistants (PDAs) are
not permitted. The exam will count 50% of your final grade.
Exam accommodations. All requests for accommodations should be
made to Linda McGuire, Associate Dean, College of Law.
REQUIRED READING:
Three course-paks will be available at the law school bookstore on the
first floor of BLB. [Note; the bookstore has limited hours after the opening
weeks of classes]:
Pak 1: Documents: decisions, briefs, statutes, manifestos and other
primary sources
Pak 2: Commentary: essays, treatises, histories, and other secondary
sources
Pak 3: Historians and Lawyers in Court: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003
The course-paks will be prepared on three-hole punch paper, so that you
can easily keep them in binders. You should plan to bring to class the
readings we will be discussing that day. From time to time we may add a
document or two.
One required book: MELTON McLAURIN, CELIA: A SLAVE
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SCHEDULE
Wed Aug 27: Introduction
Introduction to course
Mon Sept 1: LABOR DAY
No Class
PART ONE: LAW AND PATRIARCHY
Wed. Sept 3: Antique Traditions in Early America
Pak #2:

Gerda Lerner, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, ch. 5

Pak #1:

CODE OF HAMMURABI, selections

Sir William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
ENGLAND, 1771-1778 selections
According to the condition of the mother, Virginia
17th century.
Fulton v. Shaw (Va. 1827)

statute,

Mon. Sept 8: Sexuality in Early America
Pak #2:

John D'Emilio and Estelle Freedman, A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY,

chs. 1 & 2

Mary Beth Norton, Thomas/Thomasina, in FOUNDING
MOTHERS AND FATHERS: GENDERED POWER AND THE
FORMING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY

Pak #1:

(1996).

Tapping Reeve, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME,
selections

Wed. Sept 10: The Culture of Coverture
Mon Sept 15:
Pak #1:

Cases on coverture (Pak #1)
Prescott v. Brown (Maine 1843)
Lanier v. Ross (N.C. 1834)
Bradley v. State (Miss. 1824)
State v. Rhodes (N.C. 1868)
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Conner v. Shepherd (Mass. 1818)
Allen v. McCoy (Ohio 1838)
Comparison between English and Civil Law systems:
Pak #2:

Pak #1:

Deborah Rosen, Women and Property Across Colonial
America: Comparison of Legal Systems in New Mexico
and New York, 60 WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY, 355381, 3d series (2003)
Bea Ann Smith, The PartnershipTheory of Marriage, 68
TEX. L. REV. 689 (1990) selections
Van Maren v. Johnson (Calif 1860)

We d. Sept 17: Living with Slavery
Melton McLaurin, CELIA: A SLAVE (1991)
Pak #2:

Adrienne Davis, "The Private Law of Sex and Race: An
Antebellum Perspective," 51 STANFoRD L. REV. 221
(1999) selections

Pak #1:

Stephens v. Clements (Penn. 1814)

Mo n. Sept 22: Destabilizing Coverture
Pak #1:

Documents: Married Women's Property Acts:
Mississippi statute (1839)
New York statutes (1848, 1861)
Iowa statutes (1846, 1866)
Declaration of Sentiments (1848)

Pak #2:

Commentary: Gerda Lerner, The Meanings of Seneca
Falls, 1848-1998, DISSENT, Fall, 1998, abridged
Reva Siegel, Home as Work: The First Women's Rights
Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880,
103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994) selections

Pak #1:

Brooks v. Schwerin (N.Y. 1873)
H. Apple Co. v. Ganong (Miss. 1872)
McElfresh v. Kirkendall (Iowa 1873)
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PART TWO: RENEGOTIATING CITIZENSHIP 1865-1962
Wed. Sept 24: Race, Gender and Citizenship after the Civil War
Mon. Sept 29:
Pak #1:

Documents: 13th, 14th, 15th Amendments
Coger v. North West Union Pakcet Co. (Iowa 1873)
Bradwell v. Illinois [1873]
Minor v. Happersett [1875]
Plessy v. Ferguson [1896]

Pak #2:

Ellen Carol DuBois, Taking the Law into Our Own Hands:
Bradwell, Minor, and Suffrage Militance in the 1870s, in
VISIBLE WOMEN, NEW ESSAYS ON AMERICAN ACTIVISM

(1993)

Wed. Oct 1:

Sex and Marriage

Wed. Oct 8:
Pak #1:

Scott v. Georgia (Ga 1869)
In re Hobbs (N.D. Ga 1871)
Reynolds v. US (1878)
Comstock law (1873) and People v. Friede (N.Y. 1929)
Muller v. Orgeon (1908) and Brandeis Brief for Muller v.
Oregeon selections
Mackenzie v. Hare (1915)
Loving v. Virginia (1967)

Pak #2:

Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction
Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 YALE
J. OF L. AND THE HUMANITIES 251 (1999) selections
George Chauncey, GAY NEW YORK, selections

Nancy Cott, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OFMARRIAGE AND
THE NATION, ch. 3 (2000)

Mon. Oct 13: Suffrage Struggle
Pak #1:

Coggeshall v. City of Des Moines (1908)
19th Amendment

Pak #2:

Eleanor McConnell, Fighting City Hall: The Battle for
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Municipal Suffrage in ProgressiveEra Des Moines,
unpublished paper, 2001
Reva Siegel, She, the People, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947
(2002) selections
Selections from documentary film, One Woman, One Vote,
will be shown in class
Wed Oct 15: The Limits of Suffrage, the Persistence of Coverture
Pak #1:

U.S. v. Schwimmer (1929) [military service
citizenship]
Breedlove v. Suttles (1937) [poll tax]
Goesaert v. Cleary (1948) [employment]
Hoyt v. Florida (1961) [jury service]
United States v. Yazell (1966) [Texas coverture]

Pak #2:

Alice Kessler-Harris, THE PURSUIT OF EQUITY, ch. 3.

and

PART THREE: NEW HARMS. NEW MEANINGS:
REINTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION
Mon. Oct 20: Law and Grassroots Social Movements
Wed. Oct 22:
Pak #2:

Pauli Murray & Mary 0. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the
Law, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV 232 (1965)
Cynthia Harrison, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX, selection
Brenda Feigen, NOT ONE OF THE BOYS (2000) selections
DEAR SISTERS: DISPATCHES FROM THE WOMEN'S
LIBERATION MOVEMENT (Rosalyn Baxandall and Linda

Gordon eds., 2001)
SDS Women, To the Women of the Left, 1967
Redstockings, Manifesto
Radicalesbian, The Woman Identified Woman, 1970
Doris Wright, Angry Notes from a Black Feminist, 1970
American Footbinding
Bread and Roses, Declarationof Women's
Independence, 1970
Lee Schwing, Editorialon Separatism, 1973
Patricia A. Cain, Tales from the Gender Garden:
Transsexuals and Anti-Discrimination Law, 75 DENVER
UNIV. L. REV. 1321 (1998) selections
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Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title IX, 1972 Education Amendments
Phillips v. Martin Marietta (1969): opinion and amicus
brief
Faith Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House (1969)
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. (7th Cir. 1984)
What's Fair? What's Equal?

Wed Oct 29:
Mon Nov 3:

Part One

Pak #1:

Reed v. Reed (1971)
Frontiero v Richardson (1973)
Craig v. Boren (1976)
Geduldig v. Aiello (1974)
Equal Rights Amendment

Pak #2:

Linda K. Kerber, Sally Reed Demands Equal Treatment, in
DAYS OF DESTINY (James McPherson & Allan Brinkley
eds., 2002)
David E. Kyvig, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS:
AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, (1996),
selectionfrom ch. 17
Part Two

Pak #2:

Mary Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the
Connecticut Supreme Court Before Griswold, 75 IOWA L.
REv. 915 (1990)
James Mohr, Iowa's Abortion Battles of the Late 1960s
and Early 1970s, 50 ANNALS OF IOWA 63 (1989)
Sarah Weddington, A QUESTION OF CHOICE selections
Joyce Murdoch & Deb Price, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY
MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT, selections

Pak #1:

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)
Roe v. Wade (1973)
Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attomey_(1975) affirmed, 1976
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Wed. Nov 5:

Guest Lecture: Modern Harms

Mon. Nov 10: PAPER PRESENTATIONS
Wed. Nov 12: PAPER PRESENTATIONS
Mon. Nov 17: PAPER PRESENTATIONS
Wed. Nov 19: PAPER PRESENTATIONS
ThanksgivingBreak
Mon. Dec 1:

[conferences on revising papers]

Wed. Dec 3:

Historians in the Courts:

Pak #3:

Lawrence v. Texas opinions
Lawrence v. Texas Brief of Professors of History, other
briefs
Sylvia Law et al., THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN (1989) Forum
on whether historians should write briefs
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